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 NOTE 
Are We All in This Together? Enforcing 
Class Arbitration Waivers 
 Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2016) 
Ariel Monroe Kiefer* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Mandatory class arbitration waivers are increasingly common in employ-
ment agreements.1  It is estimated that forty-three percent of companies have 
mandatory class arbitration waivers.2  Employees sign them because they either 
do not believe they will ever have a major problem with their employer, they 
believe arbitration is a cheaper and faster method of dispute resolution, or they 
simply do not read or understand the clause.3  Employees should question class 
action waivers because they take away employees’ access to the court system 
and their right to collective action.4  If employees cannot go to the courts or act 
collectively to enforce their rights, the country might stop making progress or 
even lose the progress it is making in protecting workers from discrimination, 
unjust termination, and unfair wages due to a lack of recourse against illegal 
actions by employers.5  For example, unions are able to secure better wages 
and working conditions for employees than employees are able to secure on 
 
* B.A., University of Missouri, 2015; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of 
Law, 2018; Associate Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2017–2018.  I would like to extend 
a special thank you to Associate Dean Gely and the entire Missouri Law Review staff 
for their support and guidance in writing this Note. 
 1. KATHERINE V.W. STONE & ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, THE ARBITRATION 
EPIDEMIC: MANDATORY ARBITRATION DEPRIVES WORKERS AND CONSUMERS OF THEIR 
RIGHTS 3 (2015), http://www.epi.org/files/2015/arbitration-epidemic.pdf.  It is difficult 
to determine the exact number of employers with mandatory class arbitration waivers 
since companies do not have to report whether they have arbitration agreements to any 
government agency.  Id. at 15. 
 2. Lauren Weber, More Companies Block Employees from Filing Suits, WALL 
STREET J. (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/more-companies-block-staff-
from-suing-1427824287.  This percentage is based on a study of 350 companies con-
ducted by Carlton Fields Jorden Burt LLP in 2014.  Id.  The percentage has risen dra-
matically from only sixteen percent in 2012.  Id. 
 3. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
 4. See id. at 4. 
 5. See generally id. 
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their own.  Additionally, employees are less likely to win in individual arbitra-
tion than they are in an individual lawsuit.6  If they do win in individual arbi-
tration, they generally recover less than employees who file individual law-
suits.7  The average damage award in federal courts is $176,000, while the av-
erage award in arbitration is only $36,000.8  Because class action waivers have 
a heavy impact on employee rights, courts must carefully analyze the legality 
of the waivers. 
Part II of this Note discusses the facts surrounding the Eighth Circuit’s 
decision in Cellular Sales of Missouri to uphold a class arbitration waiver.  Part 
III of this Note analyzes the approach other federal circuit courts have taken in 
upholding and striking down class arbitration waivers.  Part IV explains the 
Eighth Circuit’s rational for upholding the class arbitration waiver.  Finally, 
Part V discusses why the Eighth Circuit should not have upheld the waiver. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
John Bauer worked for Cellular Sales, an authorized Verizon Cellphone 
retailer.9  As a condition of employment, the company required employees to 
sign an agreement mandating that “[a]ll claims, disputes, or controversies . . . 
shall be decided by arbitration” and only in “an individual capacity and not as 
a plaintiff or class member in any purported class, [or] collective action.”10  
After Bauer’s employment ended, he filed a class action lawsuit against Cellu-
lar Sales.11  He alleged that Cellular Sales violated the Fair Labor Standards  
 6. Id. at 3. 
 7. See infra Part V. 
 8. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 1, at 20 tbl.1. 
 9. Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 772, 774 (8th Cir. 2016); see 
also CELLULAR SALES, https://www.cellularsales.com/store/stores/kansas/pitts-
burg/pittsburg-100401/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2017). 
 10. Cellular Sales of Mo., 824 F.3d at 774.  The pertinent paragraph of the em-
ployment agreement stated, 
 
All claims, disputes, or controversies arising out of, or in relation to this docu-
ment or Employee’s employment with Company shall be decided by arbitration 
. . . . Employee hereby agrees to arbitrate any such claims, disputes, or contro-
versies only in an individual capacity and not as a plaintiff or class member in 
any purported class, collective action, or representative proceeding . . . . The 
decision of the arbitrator shall be final, binding, and enforceable in any court of 
competent jurisdiction and the parties agree that there shall be no appeal from 
the arbitrator’s decision . . . . Except for the exchange of documents that the 
parties intend to use to support their claims and defend against the other parties’ 




 11. Id.  Bauer filed suit five months later.  Id.  The federal court’s dismissal of the 
class action was not appealed in this case; rather, it is one of the ways Bauer claims 
Cellular Sales violated his right to engage in concerted activity.  See id. at 775. 
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Act (“FLSA”)12 in several ways, including failure to pay overtime and im-
proper deductions from his wages.13  Cellular Sales moved to dismiss the action 
pursuant to the employment agreement’s mandate that claims be settled 
through individual arbitration.14  The district court held that the agreement was 
enforceable and dismissed the case.15  While the class action suit was pending, 
Bauer filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”).16 
In response to Bauer’s charge, the NLRB filed a complaint on Bauer’s 
behalf claiming that Cellular Sales’ employment agreement violated the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).17  The charge alleged that Cellular 
Sales’ requirement that employees agree to individual arbitration violated the 
employees’ right to engage in concerted activity.18  The NLRA gives employ-
ees the right to “engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of . . . 
mutual aid or protection.”19  Additionally, the NLRA states that it is an “unfair 
labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees 
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title.”20  Cellular 
Sales argued that the NLRB’s D.R. Horton decision, which held that agree-
ments prohibiting class arbitration were invalid, should not be followed in this 
case because the holding was contrary to Supreme Court of the United States 
precedent and the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).21  Cellular Sales argued 
 
 12. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012). 
 13. Cellular Sales of Mo., 824 F.3d at 774; Complaint at 2, Bauer v. Cellular Sales 
of Knoxville, Inc., (W.D. Mo. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-cv-5111). 
 14. Cellular Sales of Mo., 824 F.3d at 774. 
 15. Id. at 774–75.  The parties arbitrated the case and settled.  Id. at 775. 
 16. The NLRB is an independent federal agency that protects employees’ right to 
engage in concerted activity covered by the NLRA.  Who We Are, NAT’L LAB. REL. 
BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are (last visited Sept. 11, 2017).  The adminis-
trative agency process is different from a court proceeding.  The NLRB Process, NAT’L 
LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/nlrb-process (last visited Sept. 11, 
2017).  It starts when a charge is filed with the Regional Director.  Id.  The Regional 
Director issues a complaint and notice of hearing.  Id.  Next an administrative law judge 
presides over a trial.  Id.  The losing party can file exceptions and a panel for the NLRB 
can rule on the exceptions.  See Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC & John Bauer, 362 N.L.R.B. 
No. 27 at 1 (Mar. 16, 2015).  The losing party can then file an appeal with the federal 
circuit court.  The NLRB Process, supra.  After that, the losing party can petition for 
certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States.  Id. 
 17. Cellular Sales of Mo., 824 F.3d at 775. 
 18. Id. 
 19. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 20. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012).  The NLRB also 
argued that since the agreement did not have an opt-out provision, the agreement would 
lead employees to reasonably believe that they could not file charges with the NLRB.  
Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC & John Bauer, No. 14-CA-094714, 2013 WL 4427452 
(N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Aug. 19, 2013); see infra Part III.A.2. 
 21. Cellular Sales of Mo., 2013 WL 4427452; see also In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 
357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2288 (2012), rev’d in part, D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 
344 (5th Cir. 2013); Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012).  Cellular Sales 
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that the Supreme Court’s precedent in American Express Company,22 showing 
deference to arbitration agreements, should control.23  Last, Cellular Sales ar-
gued that the FAA mandated that the agreement be enforced.24 
An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) ruled in favor of the NLRB.25  The 
ALJ found that the NLRB ruling in D.R. Horton was controlling in this case.26  
The ALJ also found that filing a class action was a concerted activity within 
the scope of Section 7 of the NLRA.27  Although only one employee filed the 
initial suit, filing the lawsuit was concerted activity because “it [was] engaged 
in with the object of initiating or inducing group action.”28  Therefore, mandat-
ing that employees waive their rights to class-wide action as a condition of 
employment impaired employees’ Section 7 rights and violated Section 8(a)(1) 
of the NLRA.29  Additionally, Cellular Sales violated Section 8(a)(1) when it 
filed a motion to compel arbitration in response to Bauer’s class action lawsuit 
because it restricted his right to engage in concerted activity.30  The ALJ or-
dered that Cellular Sales revise or rescind the agreement and give written notice 
of the change to its employees.31  Cellular Sales filed a motion to reopen the 
record with the NLRB, but the NLRB upheld the prior ruling.32 
Cellular Sales appealed the NLRB’s ruling to the Eighth Circuit.33  Cel-
lular Sales argued that the NLRB’s decision was wrong because it relied on 
 
made this argument to the NLRB in August of 2013, which was before the Fifth Circuit 
reversed the NLRB’s decision in D.R. Horton.  Cellular Sales of Mo., 2013 WL 
4427452.  For information on the FAA, see infra Part III. 
 22. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013) (up-
holding a class arbitration waiver in a consumer contract for a credit card). 
 23. Cellular Sales of Mo., 2013 WL 4427452. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id.; In re D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. at 2277 (holding that an employer vio-
lated section 8(a)(1) by requiring employees to sign an agreement mandating individual 
arbitration to resolve all disputes as a condition of employment). 
 27. Cellular Sales of Mo., 2013 WL 4427452.  Section 7 states, “Employees shall 
have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bar-
gain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection . . . .”  National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 28. Cellular Sales of Mo., 2013 WL 4427452. 
 29. Id.; see generally infra Part III. 
 30. Cellular Sales of Mo., 2013 WL 4427452. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC & John Bauer, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 27 at 1 (Mar. 16, 
2015). 
 33. Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 772, 774 (8th Cir. 2016). 
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two prior Board decisions, D.R. Horton and Murphy Oil, that were subse-
quently reversed by the Fifth Circuit.34  The NLRB asked that the court recon-
sider its stance on class waivers in arbitration agreements.35  The Eighth Circuit 
overturned the NLRB’s administrative decision by holding that requiring em-
ployees to resolve disputes exclusively through individual arbitration does not 
violate the NLRA.36  This means that companies can require employees to re-
linquish their right to file individual lawsuits, class action lawsuits, and class 
arbitrations. 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Part discusses the history and purpose of the FAA, the NLRA, and 
individual arbitration agreements.  It then analyzes recent federal circuit deci-
sions both upholding and striking down employment agreements with class ar-
bitration waivers. 
The FAA was enacted in 1925 in response to judges’ negative treatment 
of arbitration agreements.37  Its purpose was to ensure that arbitration agree-
ments were enforced according to their terms and to ensure that courts did not 
treat them with contempt.38  It states that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in eq-
uity for the revocation of any contract.”39  The FAA places arbitration agree-
ments on equal footing with other contractual agreements.40  Accordingly, the 
FAA contains a saving clause allowing arbitration agreements to be invalidated 
for the same reasons traditional contracts are invalidated, such as unconscion-
ability and illegality.41  
 34. Id. at 775–76;  see Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013, 1018 (5th 
Cir. 2015) (holding that an employer committed no unfair labor practice by requiring 
employees to sign arbitration agreements); see also D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 
F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that an employment agreement prohibiting a 
class proceeding was enforceable because a class action procedure was not a substan-
tive right under Section 7 and because the FAA requires that arbitration agreements be 
enforced according to their terms). 
 35. Cellular Sales of Mo., 824 F.3d at 776. 
 36. Id.  The court also held that Cellular Sales’ motion to compel arbitration was 
not a violation of the NLRA because the agreement to arbitrate disputes individually 
was legal.  Id. at 776–77.  Additionally, the court held that employees would reasonably 
construe the agreement as limiting their right to file complaints with the NLRB, that 
the unfair labor practice charge was timely filed, and that Bauer was an employee 
within the meaning of the NLRA.  Id. at 777–79. 
 37. D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 362 (5th Cir. 2013); Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 
834 F.3d 975, 984 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 
U.S. 333, 339 (2011)), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017). 
 38. D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 364–65 (Graves, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part); Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 39. § 2. 
 40. Morris, 834 F.3d at 984. 
 41. Id.; § 2. 
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The NLRA was enacted in 1935 with the purpose of decreasing the power 
differential between employers and employees.42  The NLRA gives employees 
the right to “engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual 
aid or protection.”43  The NLRA strengthens an employee’s right to concerted 
action in Section 8 by stating that it is an “unfair labor practice for an employer 
. . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights 
guaranteed in section 157 of this title.”44 
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court of the United 
States held that arbitration agreements with class action waivers are enforcea-
ble.45  The Court preempted state case law prohibiting class arbitration waivers 
because “[w]hen state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type 
of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by 
the FAA.”46  The Court reasoned that class arbitration interferes with the fun-
damental benefits of arbitration because it requires procedural formality, makes 
the process slower, increases the cost, and increases the risk to defendants be-
cause there are fewer grounds for appeals.47 
However, courts have treated class arbitration waivers in employment 
contracts differently.  Several United States circuit courts have heard cases re-
garding the enforceability of collective action waivers in employment con-
tracts, but the circuits are split in their holdings.48  Courts upholding the col-
lective action waivers rely on the FAA and the Supreme Court’s favorable 
treatment of mandatory arbitration clauses.49  Courts that do not uphold collec-
tive action waivers rely on Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA, the NLRB’s inter-
pretation of the NLRA, and the “saving clause” in the FAA.50 
 
 42. D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 362. 
 43. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 44. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012). 
 45. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011). 
 46. Id. at 341. 
 47. Id. at 348–50.  Arbitration awards may be appealed on the basis that “the award 
was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means” or an arbitrator was corrupt or 
biased.  Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(2) (2012).  Additionally, an 
award may be appealed if the arbitrator refused to hear relevant evidence, refused to 
postpone a hearing for good cause, exceeded his or her power, did not exercise his or 
her authority, did not render a final and definite decision, or otherwise misbehaved.  Id. 
at § 10(a)(3)–(4). 
 48. Compare D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 357 (5th Cir. 2013) with 
Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1161 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. 
Ct. 809 (2017); see also Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 990 n.16 (9th 
Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017). 
 49. See D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 357. 
 50. See Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1161; Morris, 834 F.3d at 982. 
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A.  Courts That Enforce Collective Arbitration Waivers 
The Fifth Circuit enforced a class arbitration waiver determining that the 
right to class arbitration was procedural, not substantive.51  This distinction is 
important because while a substantive right cannot be waived by an arbitration 
agreement, a procedural right can be.52  The court supported its proposition by 
analogizing it to the class action mechanism under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which is a procedural right.53  The Fifth Circuit also found that class 
procedures listed in employment statutes, such as the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (“ADEA”) and the FLSA, were procedural rights.54 
The court focused on the FAA rather than the NLRA.55  The FAA pre-
vents arbitration clauses from being disfavored by the courts,56 and the NLRA 
protects employees’ right to collective action.57  The court reasoned that the 
NLRB’s interpretation that the NLRA required a class procedure to be availa-
ble to employees was facially neutral but that interpretation effectively disfa-
vored arbitration because class arbitration changed the fundamental advantages 
of arbitration.58  In a class arbitration, class members must be given notice, an 
opportunity to be heard, a right to opt out, and adequate representation.59  This 
makes the proceeding more expensive and more formal than individual arbi-
tration.60  The court reasoned that requiring class arbitration is “an actual im-
pediment to arbitration and violates the FAA.”61  The Fifth Circuit did not ap-
ply the FAA saving clause the same way as the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.62  
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that because class arbitration interfered with the 
main purpose of the FAA, the FAA saving clause was not a basis for invalidat-
ing the class arbitration waiver.63  According to the court, since invalidating 
the arbitration provision violated the FAA, there must be a “contrary congres-
sional command” for the NLRA to override the FAA.64  The court did not find 
 
 51. D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 357 (reversing the NLRB decision, which held that 
the arbitration waiver was invalid). 
 52. Morris, 834 F.3d at 985. 
 53. D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 357; FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 54. D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 357. 
 55. See id. at 358–60. 
 56. See id. at 358. 
 57. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 58. D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 359 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 
U.S. 333, 348 (2011)). 
 59. Id. (citing Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348). 
 60. See id. 
 61. Id. at 360. 
 62. See infra Part III.B. 
 63. D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 359–60. 
 64. Id. at 360. 
7
Kiefer: Are We All in This Together
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
932 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
a contrary congressional command in the text of the statute or legislative his-
tory, and there was no inherent conflict between the two statues.65  Therefore, 
the Fifth Circuit upheld the class arbitration waiver.66 
B.  Courts That Refuse to Enforce Collective Action Waivers 
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits refuse to enforce class arbitration waiv-
ers.  They focus on the NLRA and the FAA’s saving clause.  The Seventh and 
Ninth Circuits hold that the right to concerted activity was clearly guaranteed 
by the NLRA.67  They further hold that the FAA does not mandate that em-
ployees waive that right.68 
1. Agreements That Prohibit All Class Proceedings Violate the 
NLRA 
Courts that refuse to enforce collective action waivers focus on the rights 
granted to employees by the NLRA and find that the waivers violate those 
rights.69  The Seventh Circuit analyzed the scope of Sections 7 and 8 and held 
that the arbitration provision infringed on the employees’ Section 7 rights.70  
The court reasoned that even though Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was 
not in place when the NLRA was enacted, the right to concerted activity still 
included class arbitration.71  The court found no reason to believe that Congress 
only intended to include proceedings available at the time the NLRA was 
passed.72  Additionally, the court cited other collective procedures that existed 
when the NLRA was passed.73  The court found that “[a] collective, representa-
tive, or class legal proceeding is just such a ‘concerted activit[y]’” under Sec-
tion 7 because the plain language of the section states that “[e]mployees shall 
have the right to . . . engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of . . . 
 
 65. Id. at 360–61.  The Second Circuit also found that a class arbitration waiver 
had to be enforced pursuant to the FAA because the FLSA did not contain a contrary 
congressional command.  Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 297 (2d 
Cir. 2013) (per curiam).  Three years later, the Second Circuit reluctantly upheld a class 
arbitration waiver because it was bound by prior precedent set in Sutherland.  Patterson 
v. Raymours Furniture Co., 659 F. App’x. 40, 43 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 66. D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 362. 
 67. See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1159 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. 
granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017); Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 983 (9th 
Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017). 
 68. See Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157; see also Morris, 834 F.3d at 984. 
 69. See, e.g., Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1161; see also Morris, 834 F.3d at 981–82. 
 70. Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1154–55. 
 71. Id. at 1154. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.  For example, permissive joinder and representative suits were allowed 
long before the NLRA was passed.  Id. 
8
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mutual aid or protection.”74  The employment agreement at issue did not allow 
employees to file class actions in legal or arbitral proceedings; therefore, the 
court held that it violated Section 8 because it limited employees’ Section 7 
rights.75  Additionally, Seventh Circuit precedent holds that it does not matter 
whether the employee was coerced into signing the agreement or entered into 
it freely because requiring individual arbitration is a per se violation of the 
NLRA.76  Therefore, the Seventh Circuit stated that “[t]he very formation of 
the contract was illegal” because it limited employees’ Section 7 rights.77 
The Ninth Circuit focused on Congress’ intent in enacting the NLRA and 
held that the employment agreement barring class arbitration violated the 
NLRA.78  While all of the circuits recognize that “[t]he Board’s reasonable 
interpretations of the NLRA command deference,”79 the Ninth Circuit is one 
of the few courts that explicitly follows the steps of Chevron v. Natural Re-
source Defense Council.80  Chevron provides courts with a two-step analytical 
framework to use to review administrative decisions.81  Lechmere, Inc. v. 
NLRB instructs courts to use the Chevron two-step analysis to review the 
NLRB decisions.82  The first step under Chevron is to determine “whether Con-
gress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”83   The Ninth Circuit 
looked to the statutory language and congressional intent.84  The court found 
that Congress clearly intended concerted activity to include “[t]he pursuit of a 
concerted work-related legal claim.”85  Further, the court found that the inten-
tion was consistent with the NLRB’s interpretation of the NLRA.86  The court 
held that since pursuing collective actions was clearly included in concerted 
 
 74. Id. at 1155 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting National Labor 
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012)). 
 75. Id. (citing NLRB v. Stone, 125 F.2d 752, 756 (7th Cir. 1942), and National 
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012)). 
 76. Id. (citing Stone, 125 F.2d at 756). 
 77. Id. at 1159. 
 78. Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 981–84 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. 
granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017). 
 79. Id. at 981; see Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1153; Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v. NLRB, 
824 F.3d 772, 775 (8th Cir. 2016). 
 80. See Morris, 834 F.3d at 981. 
 81. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984).  The first step is to determine whether the statue addresses the precise issue.  Id. 
at 842.  In step two, “[I]f the statute is . . . ambiguous . . . the question for the court is 
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”  Id. 
at 843. 
 82. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536 (1992). 
 83. Morris, 834 F.3d at 981 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842). 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 982. 
 86. Id. 
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activity, requiring individual arbitration interfered with that right, thereby vio-
lating Section 8 of the NLRA.87  Since the NLRB’s interpretation of Sections 
7 and 8 was consistent with clear congressional intent, the court did not reach 
the second step of the Chevron test, which asks “whether the agency’s answer 
is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”88 
2. The FAA Does Not Require the Arbitration Agreement to Be En-
forced 
Even courts that refuse to enforce collective action waivers recognize that 
the NLRA is not the only relevant statute – the FAA must also be considered.  
The Seventh Circuit reconciled these two statues.89  If two statutes are compat-
ible, “it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional in-
tention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.”90  The Seventh Circuit did 
not find a conflict between the NLRA and the FAA because the FAA saving 
clause confirms that agreements are not enforceable at law or in equity.91  Here, 
the court held that the agreement to arbitrate violated substantive rights granted 
by the NLRA; therefore, the agreement was illegal and fell under the FAA’s 
saving clause.92  Because the court found that the FAA saving clause applied, 
the court would be overriding the NLRA if it enforced the arbitration agree-
ment.93  The court reasoned that overriding the NLRA would improperly ele-
vate the FAA over the NLRA.94 
Both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits recognized that the FAA’s purpose 
was to make contracts requiring arbitration as enforceable as other contracts, 
not more enforceable.95  While the Seventh Circuit focused on the saving 
clause, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the problem with the agreement was 
the bar on class proceedings, not that arbitration was the exclusive forum.96  If 
the agreement only allowed individual lawsuits, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that 
it would still violate the NLRA because it bars collective action.97  Like the 
Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit held that the FAA recognizes the contract 
defense of illegality because the “illegal provision [was] not targeting arbitra-
tion . . .  [so] the FAA treats the contract like any other.”98  
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 982–83; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 89. Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1157 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 
137 S. Ct. 809 (2017). 
 90. Id. (quoting Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 
528, 533 (1995)). 
 91. Id. (citing Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)). 
 92. Id.; accord Morris, 834 F.3d at 988. 
 93. Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1159. 
 94. Id. at 1159–60. 
 95. Id. at 1156; see Morris, 834 F.3d at 984. 
 96. Morris, 834 F.3d at 986; see Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157–60. 
 97. See Morris, 834 F.3d at 985–86. 
 98. Id. at 985. 
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The Seventh Circuit also found that the FAA did not override the NLRA 
because the NLRA’s right to concerted action was a substantive right, not a 
procedural right.99  Courts treat substantive rights differently from procedural 
rights.100  A substantive right is the “essential, operative protections of a stat-
ute.”101  A procedural right is an “ancillary, remedial tool[] that help[s] secure 
the substantive right.”102  An arbitration agreement cannot waive a statutory, 
substantive right,103 and courts will invalidate an arbitration agreement that 
purports to waive a substantive right.104  Courts have invalidated arbitration 
agreements where the agreement did not allow for damages authorized by stat-
utes such as treble damages in an antitrust case and exemplary and punitive 
damages in a Title VII case.105  The Seventh Circuit found that the right to 
concerted action was “at the heart of the restructuring of [the] employer/em-
ployee relationship[] that Congress meant to achieve in the statute.”106  The 
court reasoned that all of the NLRA provisions exist to enforce Section 7.107  
The Ninth Circuit agreed, stating that “substantive rights cannot be waived in 
arbitration agreements.”108  The agreement did not simply bar the substantive 
right to collective action in arbitration. Rather, it barred collective action in 
every forum; therefore, the Seventh Circuit decided that the agreement must be 
invalidated.109  The court left open the possibility that the collective arbitration 
waiver may have been enforceable if it was part of the collective bargaining 
agreement.110  The federal circuit courts are split on the impact the NLRA and 
the FAA have on the enforceability of class arbitration waivers. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In Cellular Sales, the Eighth Circuit held that employment agreements 
requiring individual arbitration are enforceable.111  The court recognized that 
 
 99. Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1160–61; accord Morris, 834 F.3d at 986. 
 100. See Morris, 834 F.3d at 985. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 985–86 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 48 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that the 
award of treble damages under federal antitrust statutes cannot be waived); Hadnot v. 
Bay, Ltd., 344 F.3d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that the provision of an arbitration 
agreement barring any award of punitive damages was unenforceable). 
 106. Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1160 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 
137 S. Ct. 809 (2017). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Morris, 834 F.3d at 985. 
 109. Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1161. 
 110. Id. at 1158. 
 111. Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2016). 
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the Fifth Circuit allowed such agreements, which overruled the NLRB’s prior 
decisions in D.R. Horton and Murphy Oil USA.112 
Cellular Sales relied on Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc.113  In Owen, the Eighth 
Circuit held that class waivers in arbitration agreements were enforceable in 
FLSA claims.114  The FLSA requires employees to give written consent to join 
a class action.115  The court in Owen reasoned that if an employee had to opt in 
to a class action, she could also agree not to participate in a class action.116  The 
court did not believe that the FLSA provision was a congressional command 
to override application of the FAA.117  According to the court, the FAA’s reen-
actment after the passing of the NLRA showed “that Congress intended its ar-
bitration protections to remain intact even in light of the earlier passage of [the 
NLRA].”118  Lastly, other federal circuit courts that found class arbitration 
waivers enforceable in the FLSA context persuaded the Owen court.119  The 
Cellular Sales court found that Owen’s holding was “fatal to [NLRB’s] argu-
ment ‘that a mandatory agreement requiring individual arbitration of work-re-
lated claims’ violates the NLRA.”120  The court did not grant the NLRB’s mo-
tion to reconsider Owen’s holding.121 
The court did not discuss why it did not defer to the NLRB’s interpreta-
tion.122  The court stated that it would defer to the NLRB’s interpretation of the 
NLRA if it was “rational and consistent with [the] law.”123  It also stated that it 
 
 112. Id. at 775–76; see Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013, 1018 (5th 
Cir. 2015); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013).  In D.R. 
Horton, the Fifth Circuit found that Section 7 of the NLRA was not a substantive right.  
D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 362.  The Fifth Circuit found that the agreement did not fall 
into the FAA’s saving clause, and there was no congressional command exempting the 
NLRA from the FAA.  Id.  Therefore, the court held that the class arbitration waiver 
had to be enforced.  Id. 
 113. Cellular Sales of Mo., 824 F.3d at 776. 
 114. Id. (citing Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1053–55 (8th Cir. 2013)). 
 115. Owen, 702 F.3d at 1052; Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) 
(2012). 
 116. Owen, 702 F.3d at 1052–53. 
 117. Id. at 1053. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 1054 (citing Vilches v. Travelers Cos., Inc., 413 F. App’x 487, 494 n.4 
(3d Cir. 2011); Horenstein v. Mortg. Mkt., Inc., 9 F. App’x 618, 619 (9th Cir. 2001); 
Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1378 (11th Cir. 2005); Carter v. 
Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 2004); Adkins v. Labor 
Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 503 (4th Cir. 2002); Delock v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, 
Inc., 883 F. Supp. 2d 784, 786 (E.D. Ark. 2012). 
 120. Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2016). 
 121. Id. 
 122. See id. at 775. 
 123. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Am. Firestop Sols., Inc., 673 F.3d 766, 768 (8th Cir. 
2012)). 
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need not defer to the agency’s interpretation of other federal statutes because 
they are too far removed from the NLRB’s expertise.124 
The holdings in Owen and D.R. Horton supported class waivers, which 
led the court to conclude that Cellular Sales’ agreement did not violate Section 
8(a)(1) of the NLRA.125  Because the agreement did not violate the NLRA, 
Cellular Sales’ motion to compel arbitration in the federal class action lawsuit 
also did not violate Section 8(a)(1), as it was not enforcing an unlawful provi-
sion.126  The Eighth Circuit held that employers can require employees to re-
solve all disputes with the company through individual arbitration.127 
V.  COMMENT 
The Eighth Circuit should not have upheld the waiver in Cellular Sales 
for four reasons: (1) the NLRA grants a substantive right to class proceedings; 
(2) the NLRB’s interpretation of the NLRA was reasonable and the Eighth Cir-
cuit should have deferred to it; (3) the FAA saving clause prevents the FAA 
from conflicting with the NLRA; and (4) public policy does not favor enforcing 
class arbitration waivers in employment agreements. 
A. The NLRA Grants a Substantive Right to Concerted Action 
This Section explains why Section 7 should be viewed as a substantive 
right.  Its legislative purpose shows that it was meant to protect a substantive 
right.  Additionally, the plain language and context of Section 7 distinguishes 
it from procedural rules and statutes. 
1. Unlike the FLSA, the Legislative Purpose for the NLRA Shows 
That It Grants a Substantive Right to Concerted Action 
Owen did not bind the Eighth Circuit because the NLRA grants a substan-
tive right to bring class claims, while the FLSA grants a procedural right to 
bring class claims.128  Substantive rights receive greater protection than proce-
dural rights, and an arbitration agreement cannot waive a statutory substantive 
right.129  The claim in Owen was based on the employer’s alleged violation of 
the FLSA, not a violation of the NLRA.130  The FLSA gives employees “[t]he 
right . . . to bring an action by or on behalf of any employee, and the right of 
 
 124. See id. (citing Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 144 
(2002)). 
 125. Id. at 776. 
 126. Id. at 776–77. 
 127. Id. at 776. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
628 (1985). 
 130. Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1051–52 (8th Cir. 2013). 
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any employee to become a party plaintiff to any such action.”131  The purpose 
of the FLSA is to maintain a “minimum standard of living necessary for health, 
efficiency, and general well-being of workers” so that commerce is not nega-
tively impacted.132  In contrast, the purpose of the NLRA is to “restor[e] equal-
ity of bargaining power between employers and employees.”133  The NLRA 
equalizes bargaining power by allowing employees to act collectively.134 
The legislature had different reasons for enacting each statute, and if the 
language of the statute is ambiguous, the legislative purpose affects statutory 
interpretation.135  In this case, the legislative purpose strengthens the argument 
that the NLRA grants a substantive right.  The legislature believed that the “in-
equality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full free-
dom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are orga-
nized in the corporate or other forms of ownership” led to problems in com-
merce and that “protection by law of the right of employees to organize and 
bargain collectively safeguards commerce” from those problems.136 The legis-
lature’s goal was to enhance commerce by allowing employees to band to-
gether for “mutual aid or protection.”137  Allowing employers to force employ-
ees to sign away the principle right in the statute is contrary to the NLRA’s 
purpose of protecting employees.138  Conversely, while the FLSA allows col-
lective action, its principle purpose is to benefit commerce by protecting em-
ployees’ wages and hours.139  Because the FLSA and the NLRA were enacted 
for different reasons, interpreting the NLRA’s right to concerted action as a 
substantive right, while interpreting the FLSA’s collective action provision as 
a procedural right, is justified. 
2. The Language and Context of Section 7 Shows That It Is a Sub-
stantive Right 
The plain language of Section 7 also supports the conclusion that it is a 
substantive right.  Section 7 states that “employees shall have the right . . . to 
 
 131. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012). 
 132. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2012); see Lewis v. 
Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1153 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 
(2017). 
 133. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). 
 134. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 135. See United States v. McAllister, 225 F.3d 982, 986 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Our ob-
jective in interpreting a federal statute is to give effect to the intent of Congress . . . . 
[A]bsent clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, the language is regarded 
as conclusive.” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Vig, 167 F.3d 443, 447 
(8th Cir. 1999))). 
 136. § 151. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See id.; Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1153 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. 
granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017). 
 139. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2012). 
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engage in . . . concerted activities.”140 The legislature could have used the word 
“may” if it only wanted to provide a method to bring claims rather than to grant 
a substantive right.141  Section 7 also says that employees have the right to 
“engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining 
or other mutual aid or protection.”142  Concerted action is a substantive right 
because all of the NLRA’s provisions support and protect that right.143  For 
example, Section 8 makes it an unfair labor practice for employers to deny 
employees the right to engage in concerted action.144  Section 7 does not simply 
suggest a procedure for resolving disputes; it grants employees a substantive 
right to concerted action.145 
Section 7 differs from the procedural right to a class action proceeding in 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Rule 23 is a procedural tool,146 
but Section 7 is not.147  Further, simply because Section 7 addresses an “asso-
ciational [right] does not mean that it is not substantive.”148  The First Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution guarantees “the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble,” but that does not mean it is exclusively a procedural 
right.149 
Lastly, the way in which employees assert their right to bring a class claim 
pursuant to the NLRA supports the proposition that it is a substantive right.  
The FLSA grants a procedural right because employees must give their written 
consent to become part of a class action.150  The NLRA does not have an equiv-
alent provision.151  Owen reasoned that an employee should be able to opt out 
contractually of a class arbitration proceeding if the statute requires him to opt 
 
 140. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 141. See United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1300 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Con-
gress, too, appears to be well aware of the difference between ‘may’ and ‘shall’ in the 
funding context . . . .”). 
 142.  § 157 (2012) (emphasis added); Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1161. 
 143. Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1160.  Section 158 makes it an unfair labor practice to in-
terfere with employees’ right to engage in concerted action, which is itself protected by 
Section 157.  National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012); § 157.  Sec-
tion 159 sets out guidelines for choosing representatives in concerted actions.  National 
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2012).  Section 160 gives NLRB the authority 
to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in Section 158) 
affecting commerce.  National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2012). 
 144. § 158(a)(1); § 157. 
 145. Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1160–61; Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 
980 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017). 
 146. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 147. § 157. 
 148. Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1161. 
 149. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1161. 
 150. Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1052–53 (8th Cir. 2013); Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012) (“No employee shall be a party plain-
tiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and 
such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.”). 
 151. § 157. 
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in to be part of a class action.152  This reasoning cannot apply to the NLRA 
because there is no requirement that employees give written consent to join a 
class action.153  Both the congressional intent and the language of Section 7 
support the conclusion that the NLRA should be interpreted as a substantive 
right. 
B. Deference to the NLRB’s Interpretation 
The Eighth Circuit did not uphold the NLRB’s finding that Section 7 of 
the NLRA granted a substantive right to bring class action claims.154  Notably 
absent from the court’s analysis is any discussion of why it did not defer to the 
NLRB’s interpretation.155  Unlike in Cellular Sales, there was no prior admin-
istrative agency decision in Owen.156  Therefore, the Owen court had more free-
dom to interpret the law because courts should defer to the NLRB’s interpreta-
tion of the NLRA if it is “rational and consistent with [the] law.”157  The 
NLRB’s interpretation is entitled to deference because the NLRB enforces the 
NLRA and sees a wide variety of cases concerning the NLRA.158 
It is rational to construe the NLRA as granting a substantive right to em-
ployees to engage in concerted actions, including class arbitration proceedings, 
because it is clear that this was Congress’ intention.159  It is well established 
that Section 7 protects employees’ right to pursue judicial or administrative 
claims to improve their working conditions and engage in concerted activity.160  
Therefore, Section 7 clearly includes the right to bring class claims.161  Even 
the Eighth Circuit recognizes that “a lawsuit filed in good faith by a group of 
employees to achieve more favorable terms or conditions of employment is 
 
 152. Owen, 702 F.3d at 1052–53. 
 153. Cf. § 157. 
 154. Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2016). 
 155. See id. at 775. 
 156. Id.; see Owen, 702 F.3d at 1050–51. 
 157. Cellular Sales of Mo., 824 F.3d at 775; accord Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 
F.3d 1147, 1153 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017).  But see D.R. 
Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 359 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding that the NLRB’s 
decision did not comport with the FAA). 
 158. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536 (1992); see also NLRB v. City 
Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 829 (1984) (“[O]n an issue that implicates its exper-
tise in labor relations, a reasonable construction by [the NLRB] is entitled to consider-
able deference.”). 
 159. Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. 
granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017). 
 160. Id.; See also City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. at 835 (“There is no indication that 
Congress intended to limit [Section 7] protection to situations in which an employee’s 
activity and that of his fellow employees combine with one another in any particular 
way.”). 
 161. Morris, 834 F.3d at 985–86. 
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‘concerted activity’ under § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.”162  There-
fore, the Eighth Circuit erred in failing to defer to the NLRB’s reasonable in-
terpretation of the NLRA. 
C. The FAA and Class Arbitration Waivers 
As referenced above,163 the rule of interpreting statutes is, “[w]hen two 
statutes are capable of co-existence . . . it is the duty of the courts, absent a 
clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as ef-
fective.”164  Here, the NLRA and the FAA are capable of co-existing.165  The 
FAA mandates that arbitration agreements be enforced according to their 
terms.166  However, the saving clause confirms that contracts requiring arbitra-
tion will not be enforced if they are invalid “upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity,” such as illegality.167  Since the NLRA grants a substantive right 
to concerted activity, a contract purporting to waive an employee’s right to 
concerted activity is illegal because it violates the NLRA.168  The illegal agree-
ment falls into the FAA saving clause.169  Further, the agreement is illegal be-
cause it waives the employee’s right to concerted action, not because it man-
dates arbitration.170  The NLRA and the FAA do not conflict – they “work hand 
in glove.”171 
D. Public Policy Reasons to Invalidate Class Arbitration Waivers 
in Employment Agreements 
The Eighth Circuit failed to consider the public policy arguments against 
enforcing class arbitration waivers.  It is unclear exactly how many companies 
have mandatory arbitration agreements with class waivers because the agree-
ments are private and companies are not required to report this information to 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics.172  Additionally, the government does not have 
an obligation to conduct official surveys to collect this information.173  There-
 
 162. Brady v. NFL, 644 F.3d 661, 673 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 163. See supra Part V.A. 
 164. Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1157 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Vimar 
Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 533 (1995)), cert. 
granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017). 
 165. Id. 
 166. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 167. Id.; Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157. 
 168. Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157; Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 988 
(9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017). 
 169. Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157. 
 170. Morris, 834 F.3d at 982. 
 171. Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157. 
 172. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 1 at 15. 
 173. Id.  
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fore, the most accurate estimates come from private surveys like those con-
ducted by Carlton Fields Jorden Burt LLP, which estimated that forty-three 
percent of companies have such waivers.174  Many large companies such as 
Nordstrom, Sears, and Uber have class arbitration waivers.175  Companies are 
moving toward forced class arbitration waivers because they create the em-
ployment contracts, do not allow negotiation, and require employees to sign 
the contract without changing it as a condition of employment.176 
1. Individual Arbitration Makes Litigating Small Claims Too Ex-
pensive 
Employees who are unable to bring class arbitration actions are generally 
unlikely to pursue any type of action against their employer for small claims 
because individual arbitration is expensive.177  For example, in Sutherland v. 
Ernst & Young, an employee had a claim under the FLSA for violations of the 
minimum wage and overtime provisions, which equated to $1867 in lost earn-
ings.178  The employee estimated that it would cost $160,000 in attorney’s fees, 
$25,000 in expert witness fees, and $6000 in other costs to arbitrate the claim 
individually.179  The court upheld the waiver even though the employee would 
likely spend approximately $200,000 to recover only $1867.180 
2. Fewer Remedies Are Available in Arbitration Than in Litigation 
Some remedies are effectively unavailable in individual arbitration.181  It 
is harder to get employers to end a discriminatory or illegal practice when 
claims are brought in individual arbitration.182  Because few employees are 
likely to be enterprising enough to bring claims, the company might find it 
cheaper to pay those employees to drop their claims, rather than change the 
 
 174. Weber, supra note 2.  350 companies were included in the survey.  Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See id.; see also Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 772, 774 (8th 
Cir. 2016). 
 177. See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 1, at 6. 
 178. Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 294 (2d Cir. 2013) (per cu-
riam). 
 179. Id. at 294–95. 
 180. Id. at 295. 
 181. See Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate 
Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 90 (2004).  This article discusses class arbitration waivers in 
consumer contracts; however, the logic applies equally to class arbitration waivers in 
employment contracts.   
 182. Id. 
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way it does business.183  Additionally, arbitration is private, so there is no pub-
licity to encourage the company to make a change.184 
3. Employees Are Less Likely to Prevail in Arbitration Than in Liti-
gation 
The third problem is that employees are less likely to win in arbitration 
than they are at trial.185  Employees only win 21% of cases in arbitration,186 
whereas employees win 36% of cases in federal court and 57% in state court.187  
Some employers may fare better in arbitration because they are “repeat play-
ers.”  Being a repeat player is advantageous because the employer knows how 
to proceed efficiently in arbitration.188  Additionally, employers who partici-
pate in more arbitrations before the same arbitrator tend to win more often.189  
The benefits of being a repeat player are shown in the employees’ success rates.  
For example, an employee had a 17.9% chance of winning when it was the 
employer’s first time before the arbitrator; however, after an employer had 
been before the arbitrator in twenty-five cases, the employees’ chance of win-
ning decreased to 4.5%.190  While it may be possible to combat the repeat 
player bias by hiring a lawyer who has participated in employment arbitration, 
this is unlikely to happen.191  In one study, 54.6% of employers hired law firms 
that had handled multiple employment arbitration cases, while only 10.7% of 
employees did the same.192   Some arbitration agreements state that the em-
ployer will choose the arbitrator.  If this happens, the arbitrator may favor the 
employer due to a desire for future work even though such favoritism is against 
the ethical standards for arbitrators.193  The inherent bias in the arbitration sys-
tem and high cost make it difficult for employees to bring individual arbitration 
actions.  This difficulty is exacerbated if employees cannot bring the claim with 
the help of other employees as a class arbitration. 
 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 90–91. 
 185. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 1, at 20 tbl.1. 
 186. Id.  This data is based on all employment arbitration cases administered by the 
American Arbitration Association derived from employer procedures.  Id. 
 187. Id.  The federal court cases surveyed were employment discrimination cases, 
and the state court cases included all employment disputes except civil rights cases.  Id. 
 188. Id. at 22. 
 189. Id. at 23. 
 190. Id.  This data is based on a study of 2802 employment arbitration cases from 
2003 to 2014.  Id. 
 191. See id. 
 192. Id. at 22.  The study was conducted by Alexander Colvin and Kelly Pike.  Id. 
at 22 n.57. 
 193. Id. at 23. 
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E. Future Legislation 
The legislature is aware of these policy concerns and is progressing to-
ward limiting class arbitration waivers in employment agreements.  The pro-
posed Arbitration Fairness Act (“AFA”) would invalidate pre-dispute arbitra-
tion agreements in employment agreements unless the agreement was part of 
collective bargaining.194  One premise of the statute is that the FAA was only 
intended to apply to commercial disputes.195  Another premise is that allowing 
mandatory arbitration agreements in employment contracts is unfair because 
the agreements are not truly voluntary for employees, and further, many “em-
ployees are not even aware that they have given up their rights.”196  The AFA 
has been proposed to the federal legislature several times.  The latest proposal 
was in 2015, but it did not pass.197 
More recently, the Restoring Statutory Rights and Interests of the States 
Act (“RSRISA”) of 2016 was introduced to Congress.198  This bill is similar to 
the AFA in that it would invalidate pre-dispute arbitration agreements when an 
individual or small business wants to bring a claim in court based on a statute 
or constitution.199   It would not invalidate arbitration agreements that are en-
tered into after a dispute has arisen.200  The legislation is based on the belief 
that the FAA “should not have been interpreted to[] supplant or nullify the leg-
islatively created rights and remedies which Congress, exercising its power un-
der [A]rticle I of the Constitution of the United States, has granted to the people 
of the United States for resolving disputes in state and federal courts.”201  It is 
unlikely that such a broad bill will pass, as similar bills were introduced as 
early as 2005 and failed under both democratic and republican congresses;202 
however, it will greatly benefit employees if it passes. 
 
 194. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, S. 1133, 114th Cong. § 402(a)–(b)(2) (2015). 
 195. Id. at § 2(1), (2). 
 196. Id. at § 2(3). 
 197. See id.  Similar versions of the AFA were also proposed in 2005, 2011, and 
2013.  George H. Friedman, The Proposed Arbitration Fairness Act: Still a Well-In-
tended but Potentially Dangerous Overreaction to a Legitimate Concern, ARBITRATION 
RESOL. SERVS., INC., https://www.arbresolutions.com/the-proposed-arbitration-fair-
ness-act-still-a-well-intended-but-potentially-dangerous-overreaction-to-a-legitimate-
concern/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2017). 
 198. Restoring Statutory Rights and Interests of the States Act of 2016, H.R. 4899, 
114th Cong. (2016).  The bill was introduced on April 12, 2016.  Id. 
 199. Id. at § 3(2)(b). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at § 2(a)(2). 
 202. Friedman, supra note 197.  Examples of similar bills that have been proposed 
in the past are the Arbitration Fairness Acts of 2011 and 2013.  Id. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
In Cellular Sales, the Eighth Circuit upheld a class arbitration waiver.  
The federal circuits are split on this issue.   Courts agree that the NLRA and 
the FAA are the main statutes involved in the analysis; however, courts inter-
pret the statutes differently.  Class arbitration waivers should not be upheld 
because the NLRA was enacted to give employees more bargaining power by 
granting employees the substantive right to concerted action.  The FAA man-
dates that arbitration agreements be treated the same as other agreements, and 
the saving clause prevents the FAA from conflicting with the NLRA.  Addi-
tionally, public policy considerations weigh against enforcing class arbitration 
waivers because employees will likely have financial difficulty in bringing an 
individual arbitration action, and employees are less likely to win in arbitration.  
In Cellular Sales, the Eighth Circuit upheld a class arbitration waiver, which 
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